Who’s Really Behind a Cyber Attack?
Four Types of Attacker, Four Different Responses
When a client calls us mid-breach, we need to understand three things quickly: what has happened, what is still happening, and what kind of attacker is behind it. The third question is the one that usually gets less attention than it should.
The type of attacker shapes almost every decision that follows: whether a ransom can lawfully be paid, who you need to notify, how you talk to the press, and how the incident is likely to end. In the first hours of an incident it is easy to treat every attacker as the same faceless “hacker”, and decisions made on that assumption can be hard to reverse later.
There are four broad categories of attacker you’re likely to face. We cover them here in roughly the order most organisations meet them:
- criminals
- people doing it for notoriety or bragging rights
- nation states
- terrorist or ideologically motivated actors.
The boundaries between them are not always clean. Some state-linked groups also steal for money, and some loosely organised groups of young attackers sit between crime and mischief, so what matters most in a response is motive, because motive predicts how an attacker will behave. We have not treated insiders as a separate category: a malicious or recruited insider is usually serving one of these four motives.

Criminals
Verizon’s 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report, which analysed over 22,000 security incidents, found that financial gain remained by far the most common motive behind breaches. This is the world Outbreach spends most of its time in: ransomware gangs, business email compromise crews, and data extortion groups, all running what is essentially a business.
Established groups such as Play are run like businesses, with ransomware-as-a-service affiliate schemes, support chat for their victims and a reputation on criminal forums to protect, although that reputation counts for little in practice. When the UK’s National Crime Agency and the FBI took over LockBit in February 2024, they found data belonging to victims who had paid to have it deleted, and a month later BlackCat (ALPHV) disappeared with a $22 million ransom, cheating the affiliate who had carried out the attack. The groups show each other no more loyalty: in September 2026 ShinyHunters claimed to have hacked Clop and threatened to extort its rival with the stolen data. A gang may hand over a working decryptor, but a promise to delete stolen data should never be relied on. Data theft crews such as ShinyHunters and Clop now skip encryption altogether and extort victims over stolen records alone.
Criminal groups are, in a strange way, the easiest attacker to understand. They want money, they respond to pressure and incentives, and negotiation, however unpalatable, is often part of their playbook. Our job during a criminal incident usually involves forensics to establish what was actually taken, direct negotiation experience to test what the group will settle for, and making sure any payment (if a client decides to pay) doesn’t breach sanctions law. Sanctions checks need to happen before any payment is discussed as some ransomware operators, or the individuals behind them, are subject to sanctions in one or more jurisdictions, including the US, the UK and Australia. Those three governments jointly sanctioned LockBit’s alleged leader in May 2024, and members of Evil Corp are sanctioned in all three. Organisations in the UAE also need to screen against the UAE’s targeted financial sanctions lists, which incorporate UN designations, and the US Treasury has warned that paying a sanctioned actor can breach US sanctions even when the victim did not know who was behind the attack. Making funds available to a designated person can be a criminal offence, however urgent the need to recover. Separately, in July 2025 the UK government announced plans to ban ransom payments by public sector bodies and critical national infrastructure operators, and to require other organisations to notify the government before paying. At the time of writing these measures are not yet in force. In the US, several states, including North Carolina and Florida, already prohibit state agencies and local governments from paying ransoms.
Mischief and bragging rights
Some attackers are not after money, secrets or a political point. They want to see whether they can get in, and to be able to tell people about it afterwards. This category covers everyone from lone teenagers running off-the-shelf exploit tools against whatever happens to be unpatched, often called “script kiddies”, through to more organised but still chaos-driven groups like Lapsus$, whose members, largely teenagers based in the UK and Brazil, breached Microsoft, Nvidia, Okta, and Uber during 2021 and 2022 using little more than social engineering, recruited insiders, and persistence. Scattered Spider sits close to this category too: a loose network of mostly young, English-speaking members who have also worked as affiliates of ransomware groups such as BlackCat, several of whom have been arrested in the UK and the US.
This category is marked out by unpredictability rather than technical skill, which is usually limited. A financially motivated criminal group follows a rough logic: pay, get a decryption key, move on. A group motivated by notoriety may not follow that logic at all. Lapsus$ demanded ransoms at times, but was just as likely to leak data purely for the reaction it generated, whether or not anyone paid. That makes negotiation, if it is attempted at all, a much less reliable lever than it is with a professional criminal outfit.
This group also rarely chooses its targets deliberately. They scan the internet for unpatched servers, exposed credentials and misconfigured cloud storage, and use whatever they find. That is why organisations that consider themselves too small to be a target often meet this category first, just being reachable is enough.
Nation states
22,000+
security incidents analysed
17%
of breaches driven by espionage
Source: Verizon 2025 Data Breach Investigations Report.
Nation-state activity looks very different. Government agencies including the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) consistently identify China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as the most active state cyber threats, operating through groups like APT29 (Cozy Bear) and APT28 (Fancy Bear), both linked to Russian intelligence, APT41, associated with Chinese state and criminal objectives simultaneously, and the Lazarus Group, tied to North Korea and responsible for attacks ranging from the 2014 Sony Pictures hack to the theft of around $1.5 billion in cryptocurrency from the Bybit exchange in February 2025, which the FBI attributed to North Korea. In the Gulf, Iranian groups such as APT34 (OilRig) have a long record of targeting government, energy and financial organisations.
Espionage was the motive in 17% of breaches in the 2025 DBIR, a sharp rise that Verizon attributes partly to changes in who contributed data to the report. These attackers are after intellectual property, government intelligence, and strategic advantage rather than a payday. The line with crime is blurring, though: roughly 28% of incidents involving state-sponsored actors in the same report also had a financial motive, which Verizon suggests may reflect state actors running criminal sidelines. North Korea goes further, using large-scale theft to fund the state when conventional financial channels are closed off.
Nation-state actors are well resourced, but the difference that matters most in a response is patience. A criminal gang wants to encrypt your systems and be paid within days. A state-linked actor may sit inside a network for months, sometimes years, quietly gathering information and avoiding anything that would trigger an alert. These intrusions are more often found through threat hunting or an external tip-off than through a ransom note landing on every screen in the building.
Engagements involving suspected state actors also carry different obligations. Regulators and insurers will want to know early, and organisations in critical sectors may have reporting duties to a national authority, whether that is a NIS competent authority in the UK, a sector regulator in the US, or the relevant regulator in the UAE. National agencies such as CISA in the US, the NCSC in the UK and the UAE Cyber Security Council can also support organisations dealing with significant incidents. The questions shift too, from “how do we get our data back” to “what did they access, for how long, and what can we learn about their techniques for next time.” Nation state incidents are as often seen as an intelligence exercise as a recovery one.
Terrorist and ideologically motivated actors
This is the smallest category, and also the hardest to pin down. There is no agreed international definition of terrorism, but several countries, including the UK and the US, already treat serious, politically or ideologically motivated attacks on computer systems as capable of amounting to terrorism. In practice, cyberterrorism means attacks intended to cause serious harm or fear, typically against critical infrastructure or public safety systems. Hacktivism sits at the other end of the same spectrum. It is generally nonviolent, disruptive, and aimed at drawing attention to a cause rather than causing physical or lasting harm, and for most organisations it is far more common. Pro-Russian groups such as NoName057(16) have repeatedly hit government and public sector websites across Europe, including in the UK, with denial of service attacks, and the group was the target of a Europol-coordinated disruption operation in July 2025. Hacktivist groups aligned with regional conflicts also regularly target organisations in the Gulf, and US, UK and allied agencies have jointly warned that some pro-Russia hacktivists are targeting operational technology in water and energy systems.
To date, designated terrorist organisations have made far more use of the internet for propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising than for sophisticated offensive cyber operations. Their demonstrated technical capability has generally lagged well behind that of nation states and top-tier criminal groups. That said, the concern among policymakers is real and growing, particularly around critical national infrastructure such as energy, water, and transport, where a successful attack could cause physical consequences rather than just financial loss.
For most commercial organisations, cyberterrorism will remain a background risk, while hacktivist disruption is a more realistic prospect. If your business sits within critical infrastructure, defence, or a sector that attracts ideological attention, this is a category to plan for specifically rather than fold into your general ransomware playbook.
How the type of attacker changes a response
| Attacker | What they want | Can you negotiate? | Who to tell early |
|---|---|---|---|
| Criminals | Money | Often, after sanctions checks | Regulator, insurer, police |
| Mischief and bragging rights | Attention | Unpredictable | Regulator, police |
| Nation states | Secrets, long term access | No | Regulator, insurer, national authority |
| Ideologically motivated | Disruption, a message | No | Police, national authority |
Data protection deadlines apply whoever the attacker is.
Misreading what kind of attacker you’re dealing with can lead to poor decisions in the first 48 hours of an incident, in five areas in particular:
- Negotiation approach. You can negotiate with a criminal group, and to some extent with a mischief-driven one, though its logic is far less predictable. There is nothing to negotiate with a state actor conducting espionage, and time spent trying is better spent on containment.
- Legal exposure. Paying a sanctioned group, or anyone acting for it, can be a criminal offence, and some jurisdictions restrict, or plan to restrict, payments by public bodies altogether. Engaging with what turns out to be state activity brings a different set of national security and regulatory considerations entirely.
- Who you notify, and when. Data protection deadlines apply whoever the attacker is: 72 hours to the regulator under the UK and EU GDPR and in Abu Dhabi’s ADGM, prompt notification to the UAE Data Office under federal law or to the Commissioner in the DIFC, and a patchwork of state breach notification laws in the US, where listed companies must also disclose a material incident to the SEC within four business days of deciding it is material. Beyond that, insurers, law enforcement, sector regulators and national cyber authorities all expect different information depending on the actor and the sector involved.
- How you communicate publicly. “We were targeted by an organised criminal group” and “we believe this was state-sponsored espionage” are received very differently by customers, the press, and your board, and a public statement that later proves wrong is hard to retract.
- What “recovery” actually looks like. Recovering from a ransomware encryption event is a different job to establishing what a persistent, patient intruder had access to over eighteen months.
So an early view of what kind of attacker is involved forms part of our triage on every incident, with firmer attribution following as the evidence builds. It’s also why we maintain detailed profiles on active threat groups, criminal and state-linked alike, through our threat intelligence work, so that when a client calls us, we’re not starting from zero on who might be on the other end.
Hacking Groups
If you want to understand more about how these groups operate, our Hacking Groups library profiles many of the criminal and state-linked groups behind major incidents. If you’re dealing with an incident now, working out what kind of attacker is involved is part of our first triage call, and it shapes the advice you get from that point on.
Why choose Outbreach when you don’t yet know who is attacking you?
Working out whether you’re facing criminals, a nation state or something else is part of every first triage call. As an NCSC assured provider, Outbreach brings the same approach to every kind of attacker:
Elite Assurance Status
- NCSC CIR Standard Level assured status
- Government-vetted expertise
- Continuous quality assurance
The Right Response for Every Attacker
- 24/7 emergency hotline with guaranteed response
- Early attacker profiling in triage, backed by our Hacking Groups library
- Forensics, ransom negotiation experience and sanctions checks for criminal incidents
- Threat hunting and regulator liaison for suspected state-linked activity
Proven Results
- Sophisticated threat experience including nation-state attacks
- Multi-sector expertise across industries
- Complete crisis management protecting your entire business
- Long-term resilience building beyond immediate response
Not sure who is behind your incident?
24/7 Emergency Response:
- London: +44 (0) 20 3 998 9473
- New York: +1 (929) 484 2932
- Dubai: +971 (0) 4 506 4501
Email: sales@outbreach.com
Don’t wait for an attack to test your incident response. Choose the NCSC assured provider trusted by the UK government.
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